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Section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 requires a will valid in English Law to be in writing and 
signed by the testator (or someone else at his direction)1 in circumstances where the signature 
was intended to give effect to the will.2  The signature must be made or acknowledged in the 
presence of at least two witnesses,3 and the witnesses must either “attest[ ] and sign” the will 
or acknowledge their signatures in the testator’s presence.4  The Act expressly provides, 
however, that  “no form of attestation shall be necessary”.5  In its recent Consultation Paper 
on Making A Will, the Law Commission asserted that: “[i]f ‘attestation’ does not require 
anything more than the witnesses being present and bearing witness to the testator’s signature 
(or his…acknowledgement of the signature) then the requirement for the witness to ‘attest’ 
appears redundant”,6 and provisionally proposed its removal.7  Even if the requirement is 
retained, the Commission suggested that the difficult notion of attestation “be defined to 
mean that the witness must sign the will and intend that his or her signature serve as clear 
evidence of the authenticity of the testator’s signature” and apply even where the witnesses 
have acknowledged their signatures.8 
 Meanwhile, the requirement to attest and sign remains in force, and in its 2018 
judgment in Payne v Payne, the Court of Appeal had to consider circumstances in which it 
was alleged that the witnessing of a will was invalid.9  In light of Payne and other case law, 
this note will assess the desirability of abolition or reform of attestation, as suggested by the 
Law Commission. In exploring Payne, it will consider the nature and importance of 
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attestation from a comparative perspective, with particular reference to the vital 




John Payne (henceforth only “the deceased”) had been married to Vera for over 30 years, and 
the couple had four children including a son, also called John (and referred to as such in what 
follows).  But the marriage ended in divorce and the deceased married Kim in 1997.  While 
he and Kim had no children of their own, Kim had a daughter, Emily, from a previous 
marriage.  There was a history of bad feeling between John, his son Thomas and Vera on the 
one hand, and Kim and Emily on the other, and disputes only increased following the 
deceased’s death in August 2012.  Restraining orders were made against John in respect of 
Kim. 
The deceased had made at least two purported wills.  One was made in 2012, a few 
months before his death.  It was typed, but not professionally drawn, and left his residuary 
estate to John subject to legacies of £15,000 each for Thomas and Kim.  The witnesses were 
Thomas’ girlfriend and her mother.  The other was made in 1998, around a year into the 
deceased’s marriage to Kim.  It was made on a printed form and made only one substantive 
gift: following the printed words “I give and bequeath unto”, the words “my wife Kim Payne 
my property, post office pension, insurance’s shares, and any money in my Abbey National 
account” were written in manuscript.10  The space on the form for a residuary gift was not 
filled in, but the deceased had apparently written his signature in the appropriate place on the 
form.  Underneath, there was a standard printed attestation clause: 
 
“Signed by the above-named testator (testatrix) in the presence of us present at the 
same time who in his (her) presence and at his (her) request and in the presence of 
each other have hereunto subscribed our names as witnesses.” 
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quarters stake in the home [the deceased originally shared with Vera] and a share portfolio worth an estimated 
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that-son-in-600000-battle-with-stepmother-a3800371.html [Accessed 15 April 2019]. 
There were then two sets of spaces designated “Witness”, “Address” and “Occupation”.  
Significantly, however, there was no separate space for a signature, which is at least partially 
explained by the fact that the form used apparently dated from a time when a witness was 
required to “subscribe” rather than “sign”.11  The three spaces were apparently filled in by 
Michael Hogwood and Robert Gordon in capital letters in different hands, but as Henderson 
LJ was eventually to put it, “there were no separate signatures in the sense in which that word 
is now commonly understood”.12  The will was also apparently signed by a solicitor, 
corroborating Kim’s claim that “she took it to her (or possibly the deceased’s) solicitors who 
sent it on to the Winchester District Probate Registry for safe keeping”.13  
   Numerous allegations were made between the protagonists after the deceased’s 
death, including one (investigated by the police but with no charges being pressed) that the 
2012 will had been forged altogether.  Around two years after the death, John and Thomas 
sought proof in solemn form of the 2012 will.  Kim entered a defence and counterclaim 
denying that the 2012 will was validly executed and seeking proof of the 1998 will.     
 
First Instance Decision 
 
In August 2015, Judge Faber rejected both the claim and the counterclaim, holding that 
neither will should be admitted to probate, with the result that the deceased died intestate.14  
While the size of the estate is not apparent from the Court of Appeal’s judgment, there would 
have been a division of the estate between Kim and the deceased’s issue on intestacy, with 
her probably receiving most of it.15   
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 In relation to the 2012 will, the judge found the evidence of Thomas Payne and the 
two attesting witnesses (his girlfriend and her mother) to be “utterly unreliable” such that any 
presumption of due execution16 was displaced.17  She found herself unable to hold that the 
will had been correctly witnessed or that the deceased knew and approved of its contents.18  
The issues surrounding the 2012 will arguably provide a good illustration of limitations of the 
rule that a gift to the spouse or civil partner of a witness is void,19 in light of the fact that 
Thomas and one witness were apparently in a relationship but not married so that the gift to 
him would have been unaffected.  The Law Commission has provisionally proposed reform 
to extend the rule at least to cohabitants.20 
 As for the 1998 will, Judge Faber concluded that Kim had failed to produce a copy of 
the will properly signed or to call either witness to give oral evidence (albeit that she claimed 
to know who they were).  Significantly, Kim had also failed to produce the original will, a 
fact on which the Court of Appeal would have much to say.  The judge found that Kim was 
“not an entirely reliable witness”,21 even if she accepted Kim’s account of how the will was 
executed.  The judge thus considered herself unable to find that the will was properly 
attested.  She apparently considered that the will was not validly “signed” by the witnesses, 
describing it as “unsigned with just their names and addresses in capitals”, and was 
unconvinced that she could find due execution in the absence of oral evidence giving “a 
further explanation of who put the capital letters there and[,] if it was…Mr Hogwood and Mr 
Gordon, [of whether] they did so intending to attest the will”.22  It appears that when Kim (a 
litigant in person) sought to introduce written evidence from the witnesses confirming their 
role, the judge held that this could be done only with opposing counsel’s consent, which was 
not forthcoming, and “the matter was taken no further”.23  The result, in the judge’s opinion, 
was that Kim had failed to discharge the burden of proof on her and the counter-claim would 
therefore be dismissed. 
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Court of Appeal Decision 
 
In July 2017, Briggs LJ refused John permission to appeal the rejection of the 2012 will.  
Judge Faber had correctly directed herself on the strength of the presumption of due 
execution, and was thus entitled to conclude that it was displaced “by the manifest 
untrustworthiness of the claimant’s witnesses”.24  It was not therefore open to the Court of 
Appeal to pronounce in favour of the 2012 will in 2018.  But he granted Kim permission to 
appeal in relation to the 1998 will, considering it arguable that the judge was not entitled to 
find that the Wills Act requirements were unmet, since she had accepted Kim’s evidence that 
she had seen the signing and the act of writing their names in block capitals must have 
constituted that process.   
Significantly, Mr Gordon was allowed to give oral evidence at the appeal hearing.  He 
gave an account of being asked by Kim on the telephone to “pop down” to her and the 
deceased’s house, watching the deceased sign the will and filling in the form in the presence 
of the deceased and Kim and alongside Mr Hogwood (not previously known to him). 
Henderson LJ (who gave the only substantive judgment, with Flaux LJ simply agreeing) 
admitted this evidence, alongside affidavits and informal statements from Messrs Gordon and 
Hogwood, on the basis that it was necessary to pronounce on the validity of the will.   It is 
significant that Henderson LJ did so, invoking “the overriding objective of enabling the court 
to deal with cases justly”, notwithstanding his own admission that the case did not comply 
with the principles in Ladd v Marshall25 because the relevant evidence could with reasonable 
diligence have been adduced at trial.26 
On another evidential point, Henderson LJ described it as a “serious procedural 
irregularity that should never have been allowed to happen” that the judge lacked the original 
will or even a complete copy when making her decision,27 even though Kim knew the 
original to be held by Winchester District Probate Registry.  The absence was also in spite 
inter alia of the Civil Procedure Rules’ clear instruction that “[a]ny testamentary document of 
the deceased person in the possession or control of any party must be lodged with the 
court”.28 Henderson LJ asserted that “the management of this case appears to have been 
																																																						
24 Payne at [11]. 
25 [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1489. 
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unsatisfactory, and everybody seems to have lost sight of the imperative need for [Kim] to 
comply with the requirements of CPR r 57.5”.29  She persisted in her failure even at the 
appeal hearing, and the Court of Appeal refused to give judgment until it had been produced.  
Henderson LJ’s concern is understandable. Courts have sometimes taken the extreme step of 
allowing a will to be admitted to probate where the original cannot be found and the best 
evidence of its content is the recollection of a beneficiary.30 There is nevertheless little excuse 
for relying on copies where an original is readily available in light of the will’s inherent 
purpose in facilitating the expression of testamentary wishes while serving the evidentiary 
and anti-fraud purposes of formalities, i.e. attempting to ensure an accurate record of the 
existence and contents of the disposition and thus deter interested fraudsters from 
misrepresenting the disposition’s nature.31 
 More substantively, Henderson LJ held that Mr Gordon’s evidence gave “strong 
support” to Kim’s account, in that:  
 
“The two witnesses were each present when the deceased signed the will, and by 
separately filling in their details in the specified places on the will form the natural 
inference to draw is that they thereby intended to write their names as witnesses of the 
deceased’s signature”.32 
 
Henderson LJ was conscious that this was why they had been asked to go to the deceased’s 
home, and held that there could be “no sensible reason to doubt that they were doing 
precisely what the printed attestation clause said they were doing, namely subscribing their 
names as witnesses”.33  In his view, the absence of a “conventional signature” was “hardly 
surprising” in light of the fact that the form had no specific place to put one.34   
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In considering the nature of the signature required, Henderson LJ did not think that 
the 1982 change of wording from “subscribe” to “sign” “was intended to be a change of any 
substance”, and simply involved the substitution of a “modern” word for an “archaic” one.35  
He admitted, however, that the change “has the potential to cause confusion…if it is 
interpreted as suggesting that a ‘signature’ is required, in the sense of an identifiable and 
probably unique personal mark, as when signing a cheque or other formal document, rather 
than merely writing one’s name with the intention that the act of writing it should operate as 
an attestation”, the latter being conveyed by “subscribe”.36  He nevertheless found it “easy to 
understand how the judge may have been misled into thinking that a signature in the usual 
modern sense was required” in the light of the use of the old form.37  He emphasised that the 
instructions on that form, which had not been before the judge, “drew no distinction between 
the reference to the attesting witnesses subscribing their names as witnesses (in the attestation 
clause) and the direction that they must ‘sign their names and addresses against the attestation 
clause’”.38 
In concluding, Henderson LJ held that there were “significant grounds for concern 
about the judge’s decision to reject the 1998 Will”.39  Judge Faber had “pronounced against it 
even though it appeared on its face to be validly executed, and there was no requirement in 
law for the witnesses to have ‘signed’ the will in the usual modern sense of that word, as 
opposed to writing their names with the intention of attesting it”.40  She had also reached her 
conclusion without the original or a full copy, and had not considered whether the interests of 
justice might require an adjournment of her own motion to allow the will to be obtained or 
allow at least one witness to give oral evidence.  In particular, it was a requirement in the 
case law that “at least one attesting witness must be called, if available, in a defended 
[probate] case”.41  Finally, Judge Faber “appear[ed] to have completely ignored” a “further 
very relevant consideration”: the “strong public interest in valid testamentary dispositions 
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being upheld”.42  Ultimately, Henderson LJ was “left in no doubt that the 1998 Will was 
validly executed”,43 and the Court of Appeal pronounced in favour of it. 
 
The Signature Issue 
 
The judge should be given sympathy given her inability to approve the transcript before 
medical retirement, but the approach to the signature question at both levels in Payne is 
interesting and sometimes open to criticism. It inevitably invites comparisons not simply with 
the popular notion of a “signature”, but with the case law on the definition, whether for the 
purposes of a testator or a witness (not mentioned by Henderson LJ).  The definition of a 
valid “subscription” formulated in Hindmarsh v Charlton requires that “there must either be 
the name or some mark which is intended to represent that name”.44  That definition was 
satisfied on the facts of Payne (since the names were present) even if neither of the witnesses 
thought that they were “signing”.  Even if they had made only a “mark” by writing their 
names in block capitals (a highly dubious suggestion), it would still have been intended to 
represent their names even if they had not intended to “sign” in accordance with the popular 
definition, and the question then becomes whether the change from “subscribe” to “sign” is 
key.   Henderson LJ clearly thought that it was not, and he could have cited in support (in 
addition to the differing focus of the 1982 reforms) the application of the Hindmarsh test in 
relation to the testator’s signature in, for example, Re Chalcraft45 and Re Colling (albeit that 
it was not satisfied in the latter case because the testator did not complete what was intended 
before a witness).46  Moreover, the words “sign” and “subscribe” were used interchangeably 
in Re Colling. 
 As regards the test for a valid signature for testators, despite the application of the 
Hindmarsh test in Re Chalcraft, in the latter case Willmer J also expressed the requirement as 
one that the relevant writing was “intended to be [the testatrix’s] signature”.47  The 
application of this test to witnesses could have caused difficulty on the facts of Payne if 
intention to sign is required, since it is arguable that Messrs Gordon and Hogwood did not 
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intend to sign as such, given that they were not instructed to do so and used block capitals 
rather than (one assumes) their usual signatures.  It is presumably on that basis that Matthew 
Roper asserts that the decision “give[s] the word ‘sign’ a different construction in subs.(a) 
and (d) of s.9”.48  Even for testators, however, the acceptance of “Your loving mother” as a 
valid signature in In the Estate of Cook49 demonstrates that a valid signature need not 
necessarily be (as Henderson LJ put it) “an identifiable and probably unique personal mark, 
as when signing a cheque or other formal document”.50 Williams, Mortimer & Sunnucks’ 
formulation is that the writing must be done  “with the purpose of authenticating the 
document”,51 and the Court of Appeal found that the witnesses in Payne did so. 
Amy Proferes emphasises that: (1) Payne should not be taken as authority that writing 
one’s name in block capitals is a “signature”; and (2) according to Payne a “signature” is not 
required for a valid attestation.52  But both of Proferes’ propositions fly in the face of the 
wording of section 9, which expressly requires a signature.  This is true despite the possibility  
that Judge Faber in her overturned first instance decision thought that writing one’s name in 
block capitals was not a “signature”.  Even she could be interpreted as saying that writing 
one’s name in capitals could be a signature if supported by evidence of intention to attest 
(seemingly stronger than what would be required where a witness used his usual signature), 
albeit that she was (dubiously) unconvinced that sufficient evidence existed. The better view 
is that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Payne establishes that (at least in the case of 
witnesses) the notion of a “signature” for the purposes of section 9 is broad enough to include 
writing one’s name in block capitals (when done with the intention of attesting).  If that view 
is adopted, the outcome in Payne can easily be reconciled with the statutory requirements 
rather than appearing to flout them.  The relationship between signature and attestation is 
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The Nature and Importance of Attestation 
 
It has been seen that Henderson LJ was convinced of the validity of the will because the 
witnesses wrote their names “with the intention of attesting it”.53  Although Judge Faber 
considered the will to be ”unsigned” (suggesting that s 9(d) was self-evidently not fulfilled), 
we have seen that even she was open to being convinced that it was validly attested with 
further evidence.  The difficult notion of “attestation” and its relationship with the apparently 
cumulative signature requirement must therefore be unpacked. 
 In a response to the Law Commission’s Making A Will Paper composed for the 
Society of Legal Scholars, Simon Cooper identifies three “difficulties with the meaning of 
attestation”.54  First, on his analysis, “although it was originally understood as the observation 
by a person of the testator’s carrying out of the solemnities required for a valid will, the word 
has undoubtedly shifted in meaning at least in legal circles to refer to the written record of 
that observation”.55  Some evidence can still be found for the first understanding.  For 
example, according to the Probate Practice Manual, “[t]he attestation is the observance of 
the testator’s signature (or the signature of the person signing on behalf of the testator) so that 
he can give evidence at a later stage of what he saw if required”.56  Moreover, it is arguably 
telling that in “Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills”, the US-based scholar 
James Lindgren appears to view abolishing the requirement for attestation as tantamount to 
abolishing the requirement for witnesses altogether, which supports the view that attestation 
relates to the witnessing itself, and also arguably adds weight to the notion that attestation 
itself has little independent meaning.57  In a paper focusing on attestation in the context of 
deeds rather than wills, Martin Dray suggests that:  
 
“…since the very purpose (and beneficial effect) of attestation is to limit the scope for 
disputes as to whether the document was signed by its purported maker and the 
circumstances in which it was so signed, and to give some…protection to the other 
																																																						
53 Payne at [44]. 
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55 Ibid. 
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parties (who can have more confidence in the genuineness of the signature by reason 
of the attestation), it can be said that witnessing, rather than signing by the witness as 
a record of the same, is the essential ingredient for attestation”.58   
 
He ultimately concludes, however, that “the view that will most likely hold sway in the 
twenty-first century is that ‘attest’ is to be interpreted as obliging any witness not only to 
observe the maker’s signature (and, if necessary, testify thereto) but also to record such 
observance through the witness’s own signature on the document”.59  While Dray was 
writing in the context of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 (which 
does not expressly require the witness to sign the deed),60 his analysis is ultimately consistent 
with the “written record” view. 
 The notion of “intention to attest”, key to Payne and also reflected in Theobald on 
Wills,61 is arguably problematic for the “observation” view.  Given that the signature follows 
the observance of formalities, it is difficult to see how intention to attest can be present when 
the witness has already observed the testator’s signature. It fits more easily with the “written 
record” view, if the witness is understood to be saying that he has observed the signature and 
is willing to vouch for the fact that all proceeded properly.   Henderson LJ’s emphasis on 
“intention to attest” fits with the Law Commission’s proposed reformulation involving an 
intention that the witness’ signature “serve as clear evidence of the authenticity of the 
testator’s signature”, 62 which in turn fits with the function of formality requirements and is to 
be welcomed. 
 Secondly, Cooper identifies “the question whether in the statutory requirement to 
‘attest and sign the will’, the person is attesting (without identifying a particular subject 
matter) or is attesting the will”.63  This aspect was not a prominent source of difficulty on the 
facts of Payne itself, since Messrs Hogwood and Gordon clearly knew that they were 
purporting to witness a will.  But it has been in other cases: in Re Whelen, for example, one 
of the issues was that the witnesses had been asked to witness only one will and not the two 
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that they had signed.64  In Ashraf v Shah,65 while there were many problematic issues, one 
mentioned several times by the judge in the course of a short judgment was that the purported 
witness believed he was signing a lease when in fact he was signing a will. 
In New South Wales, however, where the basic formality requirements are similar to 
those in the 1837 Act,66 it is expressly provided that “[a] will that is executed in accordance 
with this Act is validly executed even if one or more witnesses to the will did not know that 
the document he or she attested and signed was a will”.67  This may suggest that it is possible 
to attest a signature without knowing the nature of the document, and it is certainly axiomatic 
that a witness need not know the content of a will.68  But it is arguable that the value of a 
witness’ evidence on the circumstances surrounding the will’s execution (and therefore his 
assistance of the evidentiary and anti-fraud functions of formalities) would be compromised 
without some sort of understanding of the process in which he is engaged, since such 
ignorance could make it more difficult for him to say whether the testator really did what is 
claimed. This is true even if there is English authority (accepted in Sherrington v 
Sherrington, where a requirement simply to “attest” rather than “attest…the will” was 
preferred)69 that a witness need not know that what is being signed is a will.70  An 
“understanding” requirement included within the notion of “attestation” may militate against 
its removal from the statute, again in light of the centrality of “attention to attest” in Payne.   
 A third question raised by Cooper is: “does attestation (in the sense of a written record 
of an observation) add anything to the mere application of the observer’s signature?”71  
Payne itself does not necessarily provide a clear answer to this question.  On the one hand, it 
could be argued that the important notion of “intention to attest” would become meaningless 
if attestation were not a separate requirement, which would cast significant doubt on the 
wisdom of the Law Commission’s suggested removal.  On the other, there is a possible 
implication in Payne that there would have been no valid signature at all if there had been no 
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intention to attest,72 which might reduce the work that the separate attestation requirement has 
to do, but it could still be seen as supplying a vital ingredient of the witness’s mental state 
when signing.  As Cooper notes,73 the English case law on the point (pre-dating Payne) is 
inconclusive.  While in Sherrington v Sherrington it was held that “[a]s a matter of statutory 
construction it is plainly correct that meaning over and above ‘signs the will’ must be given 
to ‘attests and’”,74 in Re Selby-Bigge (deceased) “the word ‘attest’ in its ordinry meaning” 
was considered “sufficiently wide in connection with a document such as a will to include the 
word ‘subscribe,’” such that the attestation clause on the facts was sufficient to prevent the 
requiring of affidavit evidence even though it made no reference to the witnesses having 
“subscribed”.75 
Under the US Uniform Probate Code,76 the basic principle is that a witnessed will 
must be “signed by at least two individuals, each of whom signed within a reasonable time 
after the individual witnessed either the signing of the will…or the testator’s 
acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgement of the will”.77  Significantly, a 
witness who complies with the obligation of signing within a reasonable time after witnessing 
the signing of the will etc is described as an attesting witness elsewhere in the Code,78 again 
minimising the extent to which attestation is seen as a requirement separate to signing. The 
witnesses, however, must sign “for the purpose of attesting the instrument as subscribing 
witnesses”.79 
It must be conceded that “attestation” is not a universal requirement in English Law, 
since section 9 expressly permits a witness to acknowledge his signature in the testator’s 
																																																						
72 Payne at [31] and [44]. 
73 Cooper, “Attestation”, pp.24-26. 
74 Sherrington [2005] EWCA Civ 326 at [37]. 
75 [1950] 1 All E.R. 1009, 1012. 
76 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, “Uniform Probate Code” (Uniform Law 
Commission, Last Amended or Revised in 2010) (“U.P.C.”)  
77 U.P.C., s. 2-502(a)(3)(A).  It must be noted, however, that there are also important exceptions to any 
requirement for witnesses.    The testator can “acknowledge[ ]” the will “before a notary public or other 
individual authorized by law to take acknowledgements” (s. 2-502(a)(3)(B)). In addition, there is provision for 
the validity of holographic will, in that a will is valid, “whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material 
portions of the document are in the testator’s handwriting” (s. 2-502(b)). There is also a dispensing power based 
on a principle of “harmless error” (s. 2-503). 
78 U.P.C., p.144. 
79 Mossler v Johnson, 565 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), 957; see further U.P.C., p.141. 
presence,80 something that the Law Commission proposes to rectify if the requirement is 
retained.81  If attestation, and particularly intention to attest following Payne, is important, it 
stands to reason that it should be extended.  Conversely, the fact that attestation is not 
currently a requirement in all cases does not mean that it should be abolished if it has value. 
Even though its proposed reformulation of attestation encompasses signature, it is to 
be presumed that the Law Commission does not intend to remove the signature requirement 
together with that of attestation if attestation is removed.  If the requirement to sign is 
retained but attestation removed, a clarification of the definition of signature may be required.  
It has been seen that the requirement that a testator signs and by his signature intends to give 
effect to the will are cumulative.  If a witness is required only to sign, there is the risk that 
Messrs Hogwood and Gordon’s participation in Payne would have been valid even if they 
had no idea (contrary to the actual facts) that they were engaged in the process of ensuring 
that the deceased’s signature was authentic, which is the very purpose of the requirement and 
is particularly important in the context of a vulnerable testator.  Cooper accepts this 
possibility of over-validity, but argues that “a statutory reform requiring the witness merely 
to sign would not lead to an abolition of the requirement that the witness possess the requisite 
mental state”, since the witness is expressly referred to as a witness.82   But it is not clear 
what is to be gained from potentially opening the door to questions about how much a 
witness needs to have turned his mind to the matter.  Cooper supports his view by analogising 
with the fact that “[t]he very requirement that the testator sign the will is subject to an implied 
requirement that the testator possesses an intention to execute the will”, but of course that 
intention is an express (albeit apparently separate) feature of the Act by virtue of the 
requirement that by his signature the testator intends to give effect to the will,83 and the 
Commission has not provisionally recommended its removal.  If the broadly equivalent 
express reference to attestation is removed, that mental element (so key to the acceptance of 
the attestation process in Payne) could be weakened, particularly in circumstances where a 
form such as the one used by the deceased is utilised in preference to a professionally drawn 
will.  It should also be noted that this limited mental element of intending to vouch for the 
authenticity of the execution is important whether or not it is thought necessary that the 
witness should know he is observing the signing of a will per se. 
																																																						
80 Wills Act 1837, s. 9(d)(ii). 
81 C.P. 231, Consultation Question 24. 
82 Cooper, “Attestation”, p.26. 
83 See Sloan, Borkowski’s Law of Succession, pp.115-117 for discussion. 
 If the Commission proceeds with the removal of attestation, it will also have to think 
carefully about the impact on presumptions.  While the burden of proof in Payne was initially 
on Kim as propounder of the 1998 will,84 with the judge convinced that it remained there and 
unconvinced that she had discharged it, the implication from the Court of Appeal seems to be 
that it had shifted on the basis that the will appeared to be validly executed, as evidenced 
inter alia by an attestation clause.  Although the Law Commission emphasised that “[a] 
presumption of due execution is still applied where the will is informal and contains no 
attestation clause, as long as there is no evidence that the will has not been duly executed”,85 
and it is true that “no form of attestation shall be necessary”, there is a risk that attestation 
clauses, and therefore potentially the presumption of due execution, will become less 
frequent if the statute makes no reference to attestation, with profound implications for what 
Henderson LJ termed the “strong public interest in valid testamentary dispositions being 
upheld”.  Under the Non-Contentious Probate Rules, significantly, affidavit evidence is 
required to establish due execution before granting probate in common form “where a will 
contains no attestation clause or the attestation clause is insufficient”.86 
 In an overall sense, while the implications of Payne for the future of the “attest and 
sign” requirement are not necessarily clear-cut, it arguably lends weight to the Commission’s 
provisionally proposed reformulation of attestation but militates against the alternatively 




The result in Payne is highly supportable.  There were apparently cogent reasons to be 
suspicious about the 2012 will.  But while the presence of a beneficiary such as Kate in the 
room while a will is being executed is not ideal, there was no strong reason of policy to hold 
the 1998 will invalid simply because the witnesses wrote their names in block capitals 
provided they did so with an intention to attest. This is particularly true in light of the 
flexibility about the nature of signatures generally shown by the judiciary, albeit that 
Henderson LJ did not directly consider that flexibility, and the fact that what the witnesses’ 
actions could thus be brought within existing understandings of section 9’s requirements.  
																																																						
84 Sloan, [2017] Conv. 440, 441-2. 
85 C.P. 231 at [5.12], citing Salmon v Williams-Reid [2010] EWHC 1315 (Ch). 
86 Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987/2024, r. 12. 
The Court of Appeal was justified in overturning a first instance judgment that, with respect 
to Judge Faber, was not apparently wholly coherent or procedurally sound. 
 It remains to be seen in how many more reported cases the current “attest and sign” 
requirement will be applied.  The view taken in this note is that a reformulation of attestation 
would be preferable to its removal, whatever the difficulties relating to its definition and even 
though the Uniform Probate Code (for example) does not require attestation as such on its 
face.  The reason why a witness is signing the will, i.e. that he is intending to vouch for the 
authenticity of the execution, should be clear if the requirement is properly to fulfil the 
evidentiary and anti-fraud functions of formalities.  
As a final point, the Commission’s provisional recommendation of a “dispensing 
power”, meaning that a will could in particular circumstances be admitted without full 
formality compliance, obviously has the potential profoundly to reduce the effect of any 
change to the default formality requirements.87  It could be argued that if a retained notion of 
“attestation” did ever jeopardise the validity of a propounded will, the effect could be 
ameliorated with a dispensing power such that abolition is even more undesirable. In any 
event, it seems as though section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 could remain unreformed for some 
time to come, in light of the fact that, at the time of writing, “[t]he timetable for the wills 
project is being reviewed as the Government has asked the Commission to consider the law 
relating to how and where couples can be married”.88  
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